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RISK AND THE STRATEGY OF FOREIGN LOCATION CHOICE  
IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 
 
SUMMARY 
 
While firms operating in regulated industries seek to avoid countries with high 
levels of macroeconomic uncertainty, they find it more attractive to expand into countries 
characterized by governments with discretionary policymaking capacities because they 
benefit from negotiating favorable conditions of entry. Firms in which the state holds a 
partial equity stake exhibit more tolerant attitudes towards both macroeconomic uncertainty 
and the policy risks derived from dealing with discretionary governments. Support for these 
ideas is provided by an analysis of the Latin American investments of all listed Spanish 
firms in regulated industries between 1987 and 2000. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Policy risk, foreign location choice, political strategy, regulated industries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms seek to formulate strategies conducive to superior performance taking into 
account not only market but also political factors (Baron, 1995; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Bonardi et al., 2005). Government policy is relevant to strategy formulation given its 
influence on the demand and supply of goods and services, which can be altered by a wide 
array of regulations, including product standards, production requirements, excise taxes, 
pricing guidelines, and entry and exit rules, to name but a few. While regulation has come 
to affect virtually every sector of the economy, the so-called “regulated” industries (e.g. 
telecommunications, electricity, water, oil, gas, and banking) are subject to an unusual 
degree of intervention and policy risk. In these industries governments have the ability to 
dramatically alter the profitability of firms (Henisz, 2000; Henisz and Zelner, 2001). 
Strategy scholars have long recognized that firms in such industries require specific 
theoretical and empirical analysis (Mahon and Murray, 1981; Reger et al., 1992), especially 
when it comes to studying their patterns of international expansion and their exposure to 
regulatory risk in different countries (Bonardi, 2004; Henisz and Zelner, 2005). 
During the last two decades, the predicament of firms in regulated industries has 
changed substantially. Until the 1980s they enjoyed what can be described as a “quiet life” 
(Hicks, 1935) due to their oligopolistic and even monopolistic advantages stemming from 
regulation and/or technology. Over the last twenty years, however, globalization, 
deregulation, privatization and technical change have altered their domestic competitive 
environment in substantial ways. International expansion has been a frequent response to 
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these challenges, as they sought to compensate falling margins in their deregulating home 
market by entering foreign markets where regulations kept margins at higher than 
competitive levels (Sarkar et al., 1999; Bonardi, 2004). 
Firms in regulated industries face a significant dilemma when expanding abroad. On 
the one hand, established theory and practice recommend following a gradual, staged model 
of international expansion so as to minimize risks and cope with uncertainty (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977; Chang, 1995; Rivoli and Salorio, 1996; Guillén, 2002; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2002), that is, to overcome the so-called liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1960; 
Zaheer, 1995). On the other, the regulated nature of these industries tends to require a 
strong commitment of resources and a fast pace of entry into foreign markets. This is the 
case for three interrelated reasons. First, these industries tend to be highly concentrated, and 
often they exhibit certain features of the “natural monopoly.”1 Second, entry may be 
restricted by the government, frequently under a system of licenses. And third, the 
government may own significant parts of the industry. Under these circumstances, foreign 
entrants face strong incentives to commit large amounts of resources and to establish 
operations quickly, whenever and wherever opportunities arise, and frequently via 
acquisition as opposed to greenfield investment (Sarkar et al., 1999). Thus, the regulated 
and oligopolistic nature of these industries generates strong first-mover advantages (Doh, 
2000; Knickerbocker, 1973). 
                                                          
1 A natural monopoly emerges when it is possible to exploit economies of scale over a very 
large range of output. As a result, the optimally efficient scale of production becomes a 
very high proportion of the total market demand for the product or service. 
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Recent research argues that firms in regulated industries follow “asymmetric 
strategies” in that they seek to defend their home-country position by preventing rivals 
from competing on a level playing field while pursuing entry into foreign markets as 
deregulation occurs. Given that deregulation has taken place at different moments in time 
and to different degrees from country to country, firms in regulated industries tend to 
follow a multidomestic strategy of foreign expansion, namely, they pick and choose which 
markets to enter depending on the specific circumstances present in each foreign country, 
arranging their operations with a local rather than a global logic in mind and engaging in 
limited cross-border coordination (Bonardi, 2004). Another distinctive feature of regulated 
industries is the role of the state as a shareholder. Some of the most active firms in 
regulated industries expanding abroad are former monopolies in which the state has or has 
had a controlling stake (Doh et al., 2004).   
In the next section we develop a theory of the effect of macroeconomic and policy 
risks on foreign location choice in the context of regulated industries. We build on 
Bonardi’s (2004) insight that, when expanding abroad, firms in regulated industries tend to 
follow a multidomestic strategy, negotiating separately for each market entry and arranging 
their operations as compartmentalized national organizations. We also examine the effect 
that equity control by the state has over their attitudes toward policy risk. Our point of 
departure is the well-established observation in the literature that firms in regulated (and 
concentrated) industries invest less in countries characterized by high macroeconomic and 
political risks (Henisz and Zelner, 2001). We test our predictions with data on the 
investment decisions of the 25 Spanish listed firms in regulated industries between 1987 
and 2000. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Established economic theory posits that the multinational enterprise (MNE) exists 
as a consequence of failures in the market for firm-specific competencies, whether 
technological or marketing-related (Caves, 1996; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 
1982; Teece, 1977). A superficial analysis of the evidence would suggest that this theory is 
not applicable to the phenomenon of MNEs from regulated industries such as utilities or 
telecommunications due to the facts that they generally lack proprietary technology and that 
their marketing abilities have not been fully developed because they have enjoyed a 
position of market power in the home country. However, recent research shows that these 
firms are trying to replicate in foreign countries the same advantages enjoyed in the home 
country and/or the experience accumulated at running the business (Sarkar et al., 1999; 
Guillén, 2005). For instance, they may invest abroad so as to exploit some valuable firm-
specific resource like the ability to manage relationships with regulators and customers 
(Boddewiyn and Brewer, 1994; Henisz, 2003; Bonardi, 2004; Henisz and Zelner, 2005) or 
the ability to execute projects efficiently and in due course (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). 
Therefore, firms in regulated industries lacking technologies and marketing know-how may 
still expand abroad on the basis of other useful, firm-specific skills. 
Similarly, received theory concerning foreign location choice indicates that MNEs 
pick and choose where and when to exploit their proprietary advantages depending on 
location-specific opportunities and risks (Dunning, 1988; Rivoli and Salorio, 1996). 
Holding constant for the opportunities, the received wisdom is that MNEs seek to minimize 
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the risks, entering macroeconomically and politically “safe” countries and avoiding 
problematic ones (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Henisz and Delios, 2001). Although 
international expansion always entails risks, regulated firms are unusually exposed because 
of both the large size of their investments and their dependence on the host-country 
government for munificent regulations (Henisz and Zelner, 2001). Below we follow the 
extant literature in analyzing economic and policy risks separately, but we arrive at 
somewhat different predictions. We also consider the moderating effect of state ownership 
on the foreign investing firm’s response to economic and policy risks in the host country, 
given the fact that many firms in regulated industries are wholly or partly owned by the 
state.  
 
Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Foreign Expansion 
The literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions highlights that firms 
prefer to invest in markets with low levels of macroeconomic uncertainty, especially those 
undertaking horizontal, i.e. market-seeking, investments (Dunning, 1993). The reason is 
that if the firm sets up operations in the foreign country in order to service the local market, 
unexpected variations in GDP growth rates and other macroeconomic magnitudes will 
make it more difficult for it to plan and to manage its investments. Most foreign 
investments by firms in regulated industries tend to be horizontal in nature, for they are 
undertaken as a necessary condition to be able to sell in the local market.  
A specialized branch of the literature on international investment decisions known 
as the hysteresis hypothesis shows that when faced by uncertainty in the economic 
environment the best strategy is to “wait and see” (Dixit, 1989, 1992). Building on this 
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literature, Rivoli and Salorio (1996) argue that even firms with valuable assets and useful 
knowledge may postpone investments in countries characterized by economic uncertainty. 
Having such valuable knowledge, these firms can delay the investment because of the 
monopoly they have over it. Although not conclusive, there is some empirical evidence 
showing that firms tend to avoid investments in countries with high economic uncertainty, 
especially if the size of the investment is large (Campa, 1993). Given that regulated 
industries usually entail large initial capital outlays (Sarkar et al., 1999), we expect that 
foreign investors will tend to avoid countries with high macroeconomic uncertainty. 
Several executives of the Spanish companies included in our sample for analysis are on 
record arguing that they prefer to avoid countries with macroeconomic uncertainty 
(Ontiveros et al., 2004: 19).2 Thus, we predict that: 
  
Hypothesis 1: The greater the macroeconomic uncertainty in the host 
country, the less foreign firms will invest.  
 
Policy Stability, Host-Government Discretion and Foreign Expansion 
Although much of the literature dealing with country risk has traditionally analyzed 
financial and economic variables, e.g. foreign exchange volatility or macroeconomic 
uncertainty (Click, 2003), during the last decade empirical research has turned to analyzing 
                                                          
2 See also Manuel Pizarro Moreno, President of the Association of Spanish Savings Banks, 
Diario de Sesiones del Senado: Comisión de Asuntos Iberoamericanos 186 (October 17, 
2001):20. 
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the impact of host governments on FDI decisions. The concept of “policy instability” refers 
to the likelihood that the government might change the rules of the game in a way that 
adversely affects the interests of the foreign direct investor. In general, firms prefer the 
government to be credibly committed to a set of policies and rules because that reduces the 
risk of investing (Murtha and Lenway, 1994; Murtha, 1991; Henisz, 2000; Henisz and 
Zelner, 2005). The literature also points out that governments are more credible in their 
commitment when their actions are constrained by institutional checks and balances which 
make unilateral changes less likely. The idea is that when the executive branch of 
government is not constrained in its decision-making by other branches or institutions 
within the host country (e.g. the legislature or the judiciary), there is a greater possibility of 
negatively affecting the performance of foreign direct investments (Knack and Keefer, 
1995). The chain of reasoning thus starts with the observation of the fact that governments 
differ in the extent to which they enjoy discretion in decision-making, which in turn 
reduces the credibility of their commitments, and ultimately increases the degree of policy 
instability affecting investors. Institutionally constrained governments are more credible, 
thus reducing uncertainty in the eyes of the foreign investor (Murtha and Lenway, 1994; 
Henisz, 2000; Henisz and Williamson, 1999). Previous research by Henisz and Delios 
(2001) has demonstrated that firms prefer to avoid countries with high levels of policy 
instability. 
Although policy instability potentially affects firms in any industry, its influence is 
especially relevant in the case of regulated sectors (Sarkar et al., 1999). Host governments 
can introduce general policy changes of an economic or fiscal kind. More specifically, they 
can affect prices and investment incentives in industries in which they have the authority to 
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regulate such matters, or can expropriate the assets of firms. For these reasons, firms 
operating in regulated industries will tend to minimize the risk they are assuming by 
investing only in countries where the stability of policymaking inspires enough confidence 
in them to commit to an investment.  
Several of the top executives of the Spanish firms included in our sample for 
analysis have over the years emphasized that they prefer to operate in host countries in 
which the executive branch of government, which regulates their activities, is subject to 
legislative and judicial controls, i.e. where there is, in their own words, “political stability” 
(Ontiveros et al., 2004: 4). For instance, in hearings at the Spanish Senate, the President of 
Endesa, the world’s 8th largest electrical utility and a major investor in Latin America, 
equated “certainty” with “the rule of law” and with an “impeccable institutional 
functioning.” “Most of our difficulties in Latin America have had to do with regulatory 
uncertainty.”3 Top executives of Gas Natural and electrical utilities Iberdrola and Unión 
Fenosa clearly indicated in their own writings that their companies prefer low regulatory 
risk (Brufau Niubó, 2002; Azagra Blázquez, 2002; Prieto Iglesias, 2002). In a prominent 
example, the Bolivia country manager for Repsol-YPF, the world’s ninth largest oil 
company, explained that government plans to change existing investment rules for 
companies operating in the country were “confiscatory” in that firms like his own had 
invested assuming certain conditions (International Gas Report, 24 September 2004). 
Further evidence of companies’ preference for policy stability comes from Telefónica’s 
                                                          
3 Rodolfo Martín Villa, President of Endesa, Diario de Sesiones del Senado: Comisión de 
Asuntos Iberoamericanos 155 (June 26, 2001):33. 
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reaction to the Peruvian government’s unilateral decision to slash rates by 10 percent in 
2004. The head of the local subsidiary noted that “we trust the regulator will reconsider its 
decision so that we can continue with our planned investments and persuade our 
shareholders that investing in Latin America is worthwhile” (Expansión, 12 August 2004). 
Given foreign direct investors’ preference for policy stability, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The less institutionally constrained the executive branch of 
government in the host country, the greater the policy instability and 
accordingly the less foreign firms will invest. 
 
Recent research on the international expansion of firms in regulated industries, 
however, challenges the notion that countries with high levels of policy instability are 
unattractive to foreign investors. Companies in regulated industries tend to pursue 
“asymmetric” strategies (Bonardi, 2004). On the one hand, they seek to protect their market 
position in the home market through political influence, i.e. they employ a defensive 
political strategy. On the other, they wish to enter foreign markets, though only if they can 
obtain special treatment relative to their competitors, i.e. they employ an aggressive 
economic and political strategy in foreign countries. Moreover, governments around the 
world have allowed foreign entry at different points in time, and often under vastly 
different operating conditions.  
As a result, foreign investing firms in these industries tend to adopt a multidomestic, 
one-country-at-a-time approach to foreign expansion (Bonardi, 2004). This type of strategy 
works best if the foreign entrant negotiates directly with the host country government and 
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obtains preferential treatment, something that can be more easily accomplished if the 
executive branch is not constrained by the veto power of the other branches, that is, when 
policy discretion is high. Research has documented that technological or marketing skills 
are not as important in regulated industries as the ability to deal with governments and 
regulators (Henisz, 2003; Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Lyles and Steensma, 1996). 
The paradox about these asymmetric strategies is that while the foreign investor 
would prefer a constrained executive branch during the operational phase of the investment, 
i.e. a government or regulator who cannot easily change the rules of the game, at the time 
of entry the foreign investor prefers a politically unconstrained executive branch in the host 
country so that they can obtain preferential treatment. 
Not surprisingly, the Spanish MNEs in regulated industries seem to value direct 
access to host governments, especially institutionally unconstrained ones. For instance, the 
President of Agbar—one of the world’s largest multinational water utilities—candidly 
shared with senators during a hearing that “another surprise we came across in South 
America was that authorities are much more approachable than in Spain or Europe. I can 
tell you that in [Latin American] countries similar to Spain in terms of population, one 
finds it easier to meet with a cabinet minister; it is even easier to change the appointment 
time. This is not as easy in Spain, and it is likely not easy either in France or Germany.”4  
In addition of the advantages of negotiating special treatment with an institutionally 
unconstrained government, managers of regulated firms also point out that privatization 
                                                          
4 Ricardo Fornesa Ribó, President and CEO of Aguas de Barcelona, Diario de Sesiones del 
Senado: Comisión de Asuntos Iberoamericanos 148 (June 12, 2001):3. 
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processes—which offer opportunities for foreigners to enter foreign markets—are less 
likely to occur when the executive branch is subject to the checks and balances of the other 
branches. For instance, the President of electrical utility Endesa suggested that, although 
during the operative phase of their foreign investments his company preferred governments 
with little discretion (as predicted by hypothesis 2a above), the reverse was true during the 
time leading up to initial entry: “The other big opportunity [besides Brazil] lies in Mexico, 
but […] the privatization of Mexican firms requires a constitutional amendment […] We 
shall see whether during the upcoming official visit of the [Spanish] Head of Government 
to Mexico we receive some signals regarding this issue, although I do not think it will 
happen immediately.”5 Executives at Repsol-YPF made the same point concerning the 
possibility of privatizations in the oil industry (Corporate Mexico, 22 October 2004).  
The corollary to the preceding arguments is that firms in regulated industries would 
prefer to expand throughout the world with a global strategy in mind, but the different 
moments and ways in which governments make it possible for them to enter and to operate 
require a country-by-country negotiation and strategy. As a result, the managers of firms in 
regulated industries have a preference for striking deals that offer them a political 
advantage, both in terms of gaining entry into the country and in terms of operating 
conditions. They see the advantages of an institutionally unconstrained executive that can 
help them gain entry under favorable conditions, notwithstanding the possibility that the 
                                                          
5 Rodolfo Martín Villa, President of Endesa, Diario de Sesiones del Senado: Comisión de 
Asuntos Iberoamericanos 155 (June 26, 2001):32. At the time of writing, Mexico had not 
yet privatized electricity. 
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rules of the game might change precisely because the executive is not subject to checks and 
balances. In their calculation, the benefits of preferential entry under munificent conditions 
exceed the potential damages that might obtain if the executive unilaterally changes 
operating conditions in the future, such as prices, regulations concerning new entrants, 
investment requirements, and so on. Hence, we argue that in regulated industries, 
institutionally constrained executive governments are not in the best interest of firms: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: In regulated industries, the less institutionally constrained 
the executive branch of government in the host country, the greater the 
policymaking discretion and accordingly the more foreign firms will invest. 
 
State Ownership and Foreign Expansion. Firms are heterogeneous in their 
attitudes toward risk. Social influences and organizational control systems condition the 
way in which decision makers perceive and take risks (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). A key 
characteristic of firms in regulated industries is whether they are state owned or not. A large 
body of literature indicates that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibit a different 
propensity to take risks. Compared to publicly listed firms, SOEs are not subject to the 
discipline of the stock market. Moreover, they can borrow money on better terms because 
the state is ultimately responsible for their finances. Many countries around the world 
historically adopted the practice of using the state’s budget to fund the investments of SOEs 
and to cover their (frequent) losses. As a result of their lack of accountability and the 
backing of the state, SOEs have traditionally tended to be less efficient than publicly listed 
companies (see Meggison and Netter, 2001 for a review of the empirical literature). 
 15
State ownership is also associated with inferior operating and financial performance 
because managers must pursue not only purely economic goals but also political ones, and 
there is no specific principal or owner in charge of monitoring (Sheshinski and López-
Calva, 2003). Managers of wholly state-owned firms can rest assured that their financial 
underperformance relative to other comparable firms will not endanger their tenure as long 
as they successfully pursue the other goals imposed on them by the state. 
Our analysis of the attitudes toward risk of the managers of SOEs focuses on the 
framing of foreign investment decisions. We borrow from prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), which posits that behavior towards risk 
changes with the framing of the situation. When it comes to international expansion, we 
argue that firms partially owned by the state have a different attitude towards risk than 
firms wholly owned by the state. The managers of firms wholly owned by the state and not 
undergoing a privatization process tend to have little interest in restructuring, investing 
abroad or introducing radical strategic changes (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Zhara et al., 
2000). They have little to gain from such actions and much to lose: their position in the 
domestic market seems assured, and they must pursue political in addition to financial 
goals. 
As a firm owned by the state undergoes partial privatization, its incumbent 
managers are confronted with a different type of situation. The literature documents that the 
new shareholders tend to push SOE managers to more aggressive strategies in order to 
improve financial performance, especially if some of the equity becomes publicly listed 
(Zhara et al., 2000; Gupta, 2005; Roland and Sekkat, 2000). As a result, the incumbent 
management team members may fear losing their job if they do not deliver better results. In 
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fact, privatization processes, even partial ones, frequently bring about the replacement of 
incumbent managers (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000), and in some countries as many as half 
of former SOE managers fail to get a job in the private sector subsequent to their dismissal 
(Gupta, 2005).  
Our argument is that the incumbent managers of a partially privatized SOE tend to 
frame the situation confronting them in a different way than the managers of firms fully 
owned by the state. They face the possibility of an important loss—being fired. According 
to prospect theory, people are much less risk averse when it comes to minimizing or 
avoiding losses than when they seek to lock in gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In a 
situation of partial privatization, incumbent managers will downplay the risks of major 
strategic changes (including foreign expansion) in order to play to the interests of new 
shareholders and thus enhance their chances of staying on the job. Recent theoretical and 
empirical research on privatization shows that managers prepare themselves for 
privatization by restructuring their companies (Roland and Sekkat, 2000), and that partially 
privatized firms invest more in fixed assets. Our prediction is that the managers of partially 
privatized SOEs will perceive the risks associated with macroeconomic uncertainty and 
policy instability in the foreign countries in which they might potentially invest as being 
lower or more easily tractable than the managers of either firms fully owned by the state or 
firms in which the state holds no equity. Therefore, we formulate: 
 
Hypothesis 3: As macroeconomic uncertainty and policy instability increase, 
firms in regulated industries that are partially owned by the state will invest 
more than other types of firms. 
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EMPIRICAL SETTING, DATA AND METHOD 
 
Empirical Setting 
We focus our analysis on the Latin American investments of the 25 Spanish 
companies in banking, electricity, water, oil and gas, and telecommunications. Most of 
these firms are among the biggest in the world in their respective industries. For instance, 
the largest Spanish telecommunications (Telefónica), electricity (Endesa, Iberdrola) and oil 
(Repsol) companies are among the top 12 within their respective industries as ranked in the 
Fortune Global 500 list, and the biggest Spanish banks (BBVA, Santander) among the top 
25. Most of the foreign investments of these companies have taken place in Latin America, 
due to a variety of cultural, economic and timing factors (Guillén, 2005). This empirical 
setting provides an excellent opportunity for studying the impact of risk aversion and 
imitation in regulated industries, for the following reasons. First, Spanish firms in regulated 
industries have been among the largest foreign direct investors in the world. Overall, Spain 
ranks as the 7th largest foreign direct investor, behind France, the U.S., the U.K., Germany, 
the Netherlands and Canada, and ahead of Japan, South Korea, Italy or Sweden (UNCTD, 
2004: 306). Second, prior to the late 1980s, foreign direct investments made by these firms 
were negligible due to the inward-looking character of the Spanish economy, making it 
possible to avoid left censoring problems altogether. Third, these industries have undergone 
a rapid process of deregulation starting in the late 1980s. Firms reacted to this change by 
pursuing foreign opportunities, especially in Latin America. Thus, Spanish firms in these 
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industries tried to replicate in Latin America the same advantages they had once enjoyed in 
the home country (Guillén, 2005). Finally, Latin American countries differ substantially in 
terms of the economic and political risks that they pose to foreign investors. 
 
Data 
Given that we seek to predict the occurrence of investments in specific foreign 
countries, the unit of observation is the firm-country-year. We took into consideration the 
foreign direct investments in a Latin American country undertaken by the 25 Spanish 
publicly listed firms in banking, electricity, water, oil and gas, and telecommunications that 
were included in the Madrid Stock Exchange’s General Index during the second half of the 
eighties. Some of  these firms were formerly wholly owned by the state, although by 1990 
all of the state owned companies in the aforementioned industries where, at least, partially 
privatized and listed on the Madrid Stock Market (Vergés, 1999). Most of the foreign direct 
investments conducted by the firms in our sample were acquisitions of controlling stakes in 
existing companies, frequently as the result of privatization. We compiled information on 
each investment occurred between the beginning of 1987 and the end of 2000. If in a given 
firm-country-year combination no investment occurred, our dependent variable was coded 
as zero. Otherwise, it was coded as a nonnegative integer, depending on the number of 
investments that took place.  
Our main source of information was the Prensa Baratz press database. This database 
includes all of the economic news published in all Spanish newspapers. Specifically, we 
introduced iteratively the name of each Latin American country, the name of each 
company, and the terms “investment,” “subsidiary,” “joint venture,” or “acquisition.” We 
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also searched each company’s annual reports and web pages. We identified 190 
investments in Latin American countries during the period under consideration, whose 
distribution is shown in Table 1. 
  ____________________________________ 
Table 1 about here 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Our independent variables were constructed as follows. First, we measured policy 
instability using Henisz’s (2000) POLCON V index of political constraints, which ranges 
between 0 (no constraints on the executive’s power to introduce policy changes) and 1 (full 
constraints). We substracted the constraints index from unity in order to use it as a measure 
of policy instability or governmental policymaking discretion. Second, we used Servén’s 
(1998) methodology for measuring macroeconomic uncertainty as the natural logarithm of 
the conditional variance of nominal GDP growth fitted by using a generalized conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) specification. These two variables were lagged one year in all 
analyses. Third, we measured full state ownership as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 
if the state held all of the equity in the company at the end of the year preceding the 
investment, and 0 otherwise, and similarly partial state ownership when the state held some 
equity but not all of it. The information to build these two variables was obtained from 
Vergés (1999). 
In addition to firm, host-country, industry and year fixed effects, we also used a 
series of time-varying control variables. At the country level, all regressions include: GDP 
in constant 1995 dollars to account for the size of the host country’s economy; the GDP 
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growth rate to control for the business cycle; total inward foreign direct investment flows as 
a percentage of GDP to control for the overall attractiveness of the country to foreign 
investors; and imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP to account for openness to 
trade. These variables were obtained from the World Bank. At the firm level, we controlled 
for each firm’s previous investments in any Latin American country and for inflation-
adjusted total revenues. All of these variables were lagged one year. We also included a 
time-varying dummy to indicate whether the country had initiated the process of 
implementing market-oriented reforms, including privatization and deregulation, at the time 
the investment was made. The information to build this variable was obtained from Lora 
(2000) and from various press reports. 
 
Method 
The dependent variable is the count of foreign direct investments in each unique 
firm-country-year combination, which is nonnegative, integer-valued, overdispersed, and 
longitudinal. When the outcome variable is nonnegative and integer-valued, Poisson 
regression is more appropriate than ordinary least squares. To adjust for overdispersion, we 
used the negative binomial model, a generalization of the Poisson model in which the 
assumption of equal mean and variance is relaxed (Hausman et al., 1984; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1998). Finally, we dealt with the longitudinal character of the data with firm fixed 
effects. Missing data on one or more of the independent variables reduced the effective 
sample for analysis to 4,198 observations. The fixed-effects sample spans 21 potential host 
countries in which the firm could potentially invest and 14 years. We use the “fixed-
effects” specification of Hausman et al. (1984), which includes a time-invariant variance-
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to-mean ratio for each firm (Allison and Waterman, 2005). Due to the fixed effects 
specification of our models, the number of firms in our sample fell from 25 to 14, those that 
invested at least once in Latin America during the period of study. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. Given the high 
correlation between each of the interaction terms calculated to test the last hypothesis and 
the main effects, we mean-centered the relevant continuous variables (policy instability and 
macroeconomic uncertainty) before calculating the interactions. Following established 
practice, the dichotomous main effects (full or partial state ownership) were not centered 
(Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). 
 
 ____________________________________ 
Table 2 about here 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 3 reports the results from fixed-effects negative binomial regressions using 
four different specifications: control variables only, main effects added, hypothesized 
interaction effects added, and control interaction effects added. The results are consistent 
across specifications. The prediction that firms invest less as macroeconomic uncertainty 
increases (hypothesis 1) receives support. Firms invest more, not less, as political checks 
and balances invest (in support of hypothesis 2b and in contradiction of 2a), indicating that 
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chances and conditions of entry improve as a result of the presence of an institutionally 
unconstrained executive branch enjoying policymaking discretion. We find some support 
for hypothesis 3 in that firms partially owned by the state invest more as macroeconomic 
uncertainty and policy instability increase, although the latter interaction effect is 
significant at the .09 level only. However, we do not find the main effect of partial state 
ownership to be a significant predictor. It is important to note that the two interaction terms 
included as additional controls in the fully specified model (those involving full state 
ownership) are not significant, lending further credence to our argument that it is partially 
privatized firms which are most likely to respond favorably to rising economic and political 
risk in foreign countries. 
 ____________________________________ 
Table 3 about here 
 ____________________________________ 
 
The effects are not only statistically significant and robust to changing 
specifications but also large in magnitude. Using the fixed-effects coefficient estimates 
from the fully specified model in Table 3, a one-half standard deviation increase in 
macroeconomic uncertainty would lead to a 35.9 percent decrease in the number of foreign 
direct investments ({exp[-1.02 × 0.873 × 0.5]-1}×100), and a 41.6 percent increase in the 
case of policy instability (or policymaking discretion). Firms partially owned by the state 
invest only 21.4 percent less (as opposed to 35.8 for the average firm in the sample) in 
response to a one-half standard deviation increase in macroeconomic uncertainty, that is, 
they perceive this risk as being less important. Also, they invest 51.3 percent more (as 
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opposed to 41.7 percent for the average firm) in response to a one-half standard deviation 
increase in policy instability, which also indicates that they minimize the importance of this 
other type of risk to a greater extent than other types of firms. 
Concerning control variables, only openness to foreign direct investment and trade 
turned out to be significant. Reform, company sales, company previous investments, GDP 
and GDP growth failed to reach significance in the fully specified model. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Our empirical results indicate that firms operating in regulated industries respond 
differently than other types of firms to the presence of risks in foreign locations. 
Specifically, the firms in our sample exhibited different attitudes toward different types of 
risk. They were definitely averse to macroeconomic uncertainty, like firms from other 
industries. However, over the years they displayed a preference to enter countries with 
discretionary governments, most likely because they place more value on the advantages 
that can be obtained at entry than on the risk that can potentially hurt their operations if the 
government changes the rules of the game subsequent to committing the investment. 
Moreover, firms partially owned by the state behaved in a less risk-averse way than other 
types of firms in that they invested more as macroeconomic uncertainty or policy instability 
increased. This empirical evidence is fully consistent with a view of firms in regulated 
industries emphasizing their need to deal effectively with the local government (Lyles and 
Steensma, 1996), and to pursue asymmetric strategies (Bonardi, 2004).  
 24
One possible alternative explanation for our findings is that SOEs are sometimes 
charged by governments with the task of investing abroad so as to prepare the ground for 
other types of firms to follow suit. This effect has been documented for the Spanish case 
(Casanova, 2002; Guillén, 2005). However, our statistical results are not fully consistent 
with this alternative view. While it might be true that being less averse to political risk 
could be the artifact of a government directive to “show the way” to other firms, the result 
that partially privatized firms are less risk averse than other types of firms, including those 
wholly owned by the state, contradicts this alternative explanation. Firms wholly owned by 
the state should be found to be more likely to serve as the leading foreign investors. 
A more cynical reading of our empirical results would be that firms in regulated 
industries prefer governments with discretionary power because it is easier to lobby or to 
bribe them. Firms in any industry, and especially in regulated ones, value having direct 
access to government officials and being able to come to agreements with them without the 
interference of other veto players such as the legislature or the judiciary. Our results cannot 
rule out this alternative explanation. Managers of partially privatized firms could well be 
more willing to engage in backstage deals in order to obtain better financial returns even in 
situations in which they expose themselves to a higher risk of policy reversal. One possible 
way of reconciling this possibility with our theoretical framework is to argue that managers 
factor into their decisions the benefits and the costs of dealing with institutionally 
unconstrained executive branches of government, including the advantages of privileged 
entry conditions and the associated higher probability of future policy reversals. Whatever 
the case may be, our results confirm the argument that, when expanding abroad, firms 
operating in regulated industries exploit their knowledge and skills in dealing with 
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governments and regulators. Although these firms usually lack technological or marketing 
capabilities, they know how to deal with governments and how to operate in a regulated 
context (Henisz, 2003). For this reason, high policy instability is not a barrier impossible to 
overcome for these firms. An illustration of this argument comes from Telefónica’s recent 
negotiations with the Argentine government, which the company is pursuing aggressively 
in order to ensure that regulatory conditions do not change adversely to its interests as a 
new Law of Public Utilities and a revised Law of Telecommunications are being drafted 
(Expansión, 27 August 2005).  
Our study is limited in several respects. We analyzed a specific context: investments 
undertaken by Spanish regulated firms in Latin America. Although we have a detailed data 
set including all of their investments, our results may not be entirely generalizable to 
regulated firms from other home countries investing in other host regions. In addition, this 
paper has not taken into account information regarding entry mode, i.e. whether the 
investing firm was the only investor or not. Delios and Henisz (2000) show how firms 
adapt the percent equity ownership of their FDIs to deal with foreign risks. Finally, we have 
analyzed the decision to invest, without studying the post-investment performance and its 
effects on subsequent investments. The rapid growth of Spanish FDI in Latin America 
during the last decade has allowed us to obtain very rich data to analyze the relationships 
among risk, imitation and the location of FDI. However, this rapid growth may have had 
negative consequences for some of these firms, as time compression diseconomies may 
emerge when the firm has a fast foreign expansion pace (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). It 
seems, therefore, that further research using data from other industries and countries, and 
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taking into account entry mode and performance could shed more light into these 
controversial issues. 
Despite these limitations, our theoretical and empirical analysis advances the 
existing literature in two key ways. First, we document that, while regulated firms prefer to 
operate in countries characterized by policy stability, they are even more attracted to the 
advantages that might be obtained from negotiating entry on privileged terms with 
governments that enjoy discretionary power. Thus, this paper contributes an important 
qualification to existing theories of foreign investment risk. Second, our empirical evidence 
lends some support to the idea that state ownership moderates perceptions of risk and tends 
to magnify the preference for governmental discretion and macroeconomic uncertainty in 
the host country, though only in the case of partially privatized firms. These findings offer a 
more nuanced explanation of the effects of economic and political risk on the decisions of 
firms in regulated industries that goes beyond the conventional argument that less risk is 
always preferable. 
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Table 1: Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in Latin America, 1987-2000 
 
 
Number of FDIs 
Banking 78 
Argentaria (formerly Banco Exterior de España, BEX) 5 
Banesto 2 
BBVA (formerly Banco de Bilbao) 23 
Banco Central Hispanoamericano (formerly Banco Central) 13 
Banco de Fomento 0 
Banco Hispano Americano 0 
Bankinter 0 
Banco Pastor 0 
Banco Popular Español 0 
BSCH (formerly Banco Santander) 35 
Banco de Vizcaya 0 
Banco Herrero 0 
Banco Zaragozano. 0 
Water 11 
Aguas de Barcelona (Agbar) 11 
Electricity 50 
Hidrocantábrico 1 
Endesa 16 
Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña (Fecsa) 0 
Hidroeléctrica Española (Hidrola) 0 
Iberdrola (formerly Iberduero) 12 
Compañía Sevillana de Electricidad 0 
Unión Fenosa 21 
Petroleum and Gas 30 
CEPSA 2 
Gas Natural 6 
REPSOL 22 
Telecommunications 21 
Telefónica 21 
 
Total FDIs 190 
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 4198 firm-country-years, 14 firms, 21 countries, 1987-2000) 
 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Number of investments in 
firm-country-year 
 
.04 
 
.25                
2. Policy instability 
 
 
-.02 
 
.25 -.05***               
3. Macroeconomic uncertainty 
 
 
.08 
 
.87 .03† -.09***              
4. Full State ownership 
 
 
.03 
 
.16 -.03† .06*** .03*             
5. Partial State ownership 
 
 
.22 
 
.42 .02 .01 .00 -.09***            
6. Macroeconomic uncertainty ×  
Partial State ownership 
 
.02 
 
.42 .04* -.03* .48*** -.01 .08***           
7. Policy instability × Partial  
State ownership 
 
-.00 
 
.12 -.02 .48*** -.04* .01 -.07*** -.08***          
8. Macroeconomic uncertainty × 
Full State ownership 
 
.01 
 
.13 -.01 -.01 .15*** .29*** -.02 -.00 .00         
9. Policy instability × Full State 
ownership 
 
.00 
 
.04 -.01 .18*** -.02 .24*** -.02 -.00 .00 -.10***        
10. Market reforms initiated 
 
 
.83 
 
.37 .08*** -.32*** -.04* -.19*** .03† -.01 -.14*** -.03* -.09***       
11. Firm sales 
 
 
41798.2 
 
40571.9 .12*** -.11*** -.05*** -.04* .20*** -.01 -.06*** -.01 -.01 .17***      
12. Previous firm entries in Latin 
America 
 
3.45 
 
6.46 .15*** -.17*** -.07*** -.09*** -.07*** -.02 -.05** -.02 -.02 .21*** .58***     
13. Host country’s GDPa 
 
 
7.15  
 
1.50  .15*** -.23*** .08*** -.01 -.01 .04* -.11*** -.00 -.05** .14*** .03† .04**    
14. Host country’s GDP growth 
 
 
2.98 
 
4.14 .07*** -.16*** -.03* -.03† .02 -.02 -.07*** -.00 -.05** .17*** .02 .02 -.00   
15. Host country’s inward FDI 
 
 
2.50 
 
3.88 .05*** -.22*** -.04** -.09*** -.04* -.01 -.07*** -.04* -.05** .23*** .16*** .25*** -.08*** .24***  
16. Host country’s trade 
openness 
 
61.51 
 
39.02 -.09*** .02 .03† -.04** .00 .01 .02 -.02 .01 .12*** .05** .07*** -.38*** .08*** .53*** 
 
 *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 † p < .10 
a Mean and std. dev. divided by 100,000,000,000. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Firm fixed-effects negative binomial regressions predicting foreign direct investments 
 Hypothesis A B C D 
Macroeconomic uncertainty H1 (-) -.72* -1.01** -1.02** 
  (-2.40) (-2.98) (-3.09) 
Policy instability H2a (-) 3.20** 2.83* 2.83* 
 H2b (+) (2.97) (2.17) (2.28) 
Full State ownership   .61 .53 -.11 
  (.12) (.11) (-.01) 
Partial State ownership   .75† .66 .66 
  (1.73) (.67) (.79) 
Macroeconomic uncertainty ×   H3 (+)  .64* .65* 
Partial State ownership   (2.09) (2.14) 
Policy instability × Partial  State  H3 (+)  1.54† 1.55† 
ownership   (1.70) (1.71) 
Macroeconomic uncertainty × Full     1.18 
State ownership    (.16) 
Policy instability × Full State     2.82 
ownership    (.04) 
Market reforms initiated   1.64 -.28 -.39 -.39 
  (.76) (-.11) (-.15) (-.14) 
Firm sales a  7.05 9.15† 10.1 10.2 
  (1.61) (1.72) (.63) (.76) 
Previous firm entries in Latin   -.03 -.05* -.05 -.05 
America  (-1.47) (-1.97) (-1.38) (-1.55) 
Host country’s GDP b   -24.5*** -5.94 -7.01 -7.02 
  (-3.97) (-1.04) (-1.16) (-1.19) 
Host country’s GDP growth   .08** .02 .02 .02 
  (3.13) (.90) (.90) (.91) 
Host country’s inward FDI  .11* .11* .10† .10† 
  (2.22) (1.98) (1.80) (1.80) 
Host country’s trade openness  .05* .04† .04* .04* 
  (2.42) (1.95) (2.00) (2.00) 
     
Number of observations  4198 4198 4198 4198 
Log likelihood  -502.08 -460.24 -457.25 -457.22 
Notes: z-scores shown in parentheses beneath regression coefficients. 
 *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 † p < .10 
a Coefficient multiplied by 1,000,000. 
b Coefficient multiplied by 1,000,000,000,000. 
 All regressions include firm in addition to industry, host-country and year fixed effects.  
  
